Friday, March 13, 2020

Spinozas Theory of Emotions Essays

Spinozas Theory of Emotions Essays Spinozas Theory of Emotions Paper Spinozas Theory of Emotions Paper Christian Scherrer, student number: 013851259 Analysing and synthesizing passions Aspects of Cartesian and Spinozist method It has often been noted that in the third part of his „Ethicsâ€Å" Spinoza follows in his list of definitions of affects to a great extent the one of passions given by Descartes in his â€Å"Passions de lAme† (apart from divergent evaluations of some of the passions1, like Spinoza? s refusal to include admiratio among them). It also appears that both of them are building a taxonomy of passions that introduces some kind of hierarchical order among these. We find both in Descartes as well as in Spinoza a set of passions2 out or by means of which further, in some sense more complex or specific passions are being developed from. What will be my guiding interest in this essay, is to compare and distinguish the two theories of passion according to the sense in which basic or primary passions are named thus and the way they are being discovered or identified and thereby hinting at a difference on the more general level of methodology. I want to begin with what is a starting point in Descartes? and Spinoza? s defining the passions in a general manner. It is very interesting and insightful to compare the procedures through which they arrive at their different conceptions of passions and at identifying and defining the basic ones. It is true that they both operate with the notion of causa as a starting point for their distinction between action and passion, but we should draw our attention to what follows and what comes in between their principles of causality and the definitions of the basic affects to rightly appreciate the differ ence in their approaches. In reality, though, we already find important differences in the relational structure between the notions of action, passion and cause. In the very first paragraph of the â€Å"Passions de lAme†, Descartes starts with a very general principle, adopted from other philosophers, which consists in distinguishing within the components of a causal event between two things: an 1 As Spinoza, like Descartes, names several of the defined entities in part III of the „Ethicsâ€Å" „passionsâ€Å", except from those actions whose „adaequata possimus esse causaâ€Å" (see EIIID3), I will subsequently continue to talk about pas sions, without differentiation between their being cartesian or spinozist, where this distinction by Spinoza can be applied. The references in my quotations from Spinozas â€Å"Ethics† I will always abbreviate with â€Å"E†, followed by roman num bers for the respective part, then the letters â€Å"D† for â€Å"definitione†, â€Å"P† for â€Å"propositio† plus the respective arabic numbers, â€Å"Sch† for â€Å"scholium†, â€Å"Cor† for â€Å"corollarium† etc. References to the â€Å"Passion de lAme† will be abbrevi ated by â€Å"P† plus â€Å" §Ã¢â‚¬  and the respective number of the paragraph. Also here it is adequate to speak only of passions in Spinoza`s use or the term because indeed in part 3 of the Ethics we find such affects that are derived from tristitia (which is always a passion) and laetitia only as far as „in nobis aliquid fit vel ex nostra natura aliquid sequitur, cujus nos non nisi partialis sumus causaâ€Å" (EIIID2), which means being passive. Whether kinds of active joy or even such with compon ents of passive joy can be derived from the basic affects is another question and we will shortly come back on this again. Christian Scherrer, student number: 013851259 active and a passive part in relation to which one and the same event may be called either an action or a passion. So in every single case that falls under this kind of structure we necessarily have one active and one passive component that will determine the perspective on the event relating them and decide whether it is an action or a passion. In Spinoza, on the other hand, we find a completely different structure in the relational field among these notions and we may suppose that this will have consequences on his further proceeding. First we have to consider that for Spinoza it is not enough or even wrong to say of a thing that it is active or acting insofar as it is producing an effect on some other thing. Instead, he is connecting the property of being active to self causality, when he writes in part I that God alone, as a free cause, exists and acts solely out of the necessity of his own nature 3. As God is not only causing all the finite modes but unlike these and primarily himself, it would be absurd to say that he is therefore active and passive at once. Thus, we somehow find the paradigm for activity in God? s self-causation. This also means that we can only define action and passion in their meaning for human beings in a different, more specific sense, namely, characterized as affections (and their ideas) that either augment or diminish some body? s potentia agendi. Compared to Descartes then, we also get a different idea of cause and effect, as they are not in every case identifiable as one active and one passive component connected through some affection that is always action and passion at the same time; rather, insofar as we are the adequate cause of this affection in us it is an action and we can be called active, whereas insofar as we are only an inadequate and partial cause of some affection in us we suffer a passion and are passive 4. So, what is a passion and what an action is less seen in relation to a cause and it? s effect as the one acting on the other, but rather in relation to a contextual or local conception of cause. It seems that one and the same affection can be seen in Spinoza? s thinking as action and passion at once just in case that it can be achieved to conceive of the cause in question (an idea for example) as at the same time adequate and inadequate concerning the scope that the idea of this cause comprises 5. As God can never be conceived of as 3 See EIP17Cor I and II. There is of course a very delicate aspect about the use of the words „inâ€Å" and „extraâ€Å" when Spinoza for example writes: „Nos tum agere dico, cum aliquid in nobis aut extra nos fit, cujus adaequata sumus causa ( )â€Å" (EIIID2). One might ask in what sense there can be effects outside of us insofar as we (our ideas, the affections of our body) have to be seen as their adequate causes without which the effect can not be conceived of nor exist (see EIID2, where „es senceâ€Å" is defined which is not easy to distinguish from an adequate cause). What one can follow along such considerations is a certain expansive trait in Spinoza? s theories of body and mind. 5 Therefor Spinoza writes in EIIIP1: „Further, whatever necessarily follows from an idea which in God is adequate, not insofar as He not only comprises the mind of a single man, but also the minds of other things together with the mind of this man, of this [†¦] the mind of this man is not the adequate, but the partial cause, and therefor (according to definition 2 of this part), insofar as the mind has inadequate ideas, it necessarily suffers some things. (Mind that all the English quotations from primary literature will be my translations from the original language (in this case Latin) with support drawn from the respective German translation, which is due to my lack of English edition at the time of writing this essay. ) 2 Christian Scherrer, student number: 013851259 partial cause of himself, he can only be thought of as active. A changing from passion to action in a mode is not being accomplished then by changing the direction in the relation between cause and effect, but by changing the affective condition of the mode by expanding it and transforming it to an adequate cause of the affect that has been a passion. I would like now to concentrate on the two philosophers proceeding in establishing the basic passions; and here I think we can observe some important features that can help us to recognize the pe culiarities of their methodologies which are commonly referred to as analytic in Descartes? ase and geometrical or synthetic in Spinoza? s. Unlike Spinoza, who gives us a ready definition of affects that already includes the two possible versions of them (actions and passions) in the beginning of part III after not even having mentioned them in the preceding text 6, Descartes first has to go through a long process by employing his general principle of action and passion to the relationship between body and soul to arrive at a defini tion of passions. After distinguishing what we can find as the soul? s and the body? proper functions and he makes us realize that there is a number of mental functions that could rightly be called passions of the soul; namely all those perceptions or cognitions (P §17: â€Å"toutes les sortes de perceptions ou connoissances†) which have the body as their cause and not the soul itself (see P §19). Then he goes on to distinguish different sorts of such perceptions among themselves, relying in every step of analysis on criteria of how their formation dependence from soul or body or if they show a relation to a notable and determinate perceptual cause that has been transmitted to the soul by nerves 7. Among the latter sort of perceptions, he again distinguishes and at last finds to which the name â€Å"passions of the soul†, following an ordinary restriction in the use of the expression, can be applied8, defining them in a general manner as follows: â€Å"After having considered in what the passions of the soul differ from all the other thoughts, it seems to me that one can generally define them as perceptions or sentiments or emotions of the soul which particularly referred to her, and which are caused, maintained and fortified by some movement of the animal spirits. (P §27) 6 Apart from one rather nontechnical occurrence in part one and one very general reference to affects as â€Å"modi cogit andi† in the third axiom of part two. 7 See P §21: â€Å"Or encore que quelques unes de ces imaginations soient des passions de lame, en prenant ce mot en sa plus propre plus particuliere signification; quelles puissent estre toutes ainsi nommees, si on le prend en un e signification plus generale: toutefois, pource quelles nont pas une cause si notable si determinee, que les perceptions que lame recoit par lentremise des nerves (†¦), il faut considerer la difference qui est entre ces autres. 8 See P §25: â€Å"Or encore que toutes nos perceptions (†¦) soient veritablement des passions au regard de nostre ame, lors quon prend ce mot sa plus generale signification: toutefois on a coustume de le restreindre a signifier seulement celles qui se rapportent a lame mesme. Et ce ne sont que ces dernieres, que jai entrepris icy dexpliquer sous le nom de passions de lame. † 3 Christian Scherrer, student number: 013851259 We can already see in this process that, what Descartes does, is a systematic and methodical analysis of notions that we usually do not understand properly. We are aware that there is something in each of us that we commonly call passions. But we do not, until now, really understand what they are, in what they consist, how they come about, etc. So if we want to understand our passions, just like with all the other phenomena that our scientific mind can be concerned with, we in the end need to understand their causes. In his monography â€Å"Expressionism in Philosophy, Spinoza†, Gilles Deleuze characterizes Descartes? analytic method as a process of rendering on the basis of clear and distinct ideas of effects the initially confused ideas of their causes clear and distinct. One can even say that the clear and distinct knowledge of a cause depends on the clear and distinct knowledge of its effect9. Spinoza, opposing these basic ideas in Descartes method, conceives of the right way to attain to real knowledge in an entirely different way in thinking that we always have to proceed from adequate ideas of some causes to adequate ideas of their effects and that the former consist in definitions that are appropriate for expressing the essence of this cause and also involve already the essence of its effects. So we can see how from Spinoza? s point of view the whole procedure of Descartes tries to go in a wrong direction. What has to be done first in Descartes method is not to elaborate a definition that adequately expresses the essence of the cause of the things that we want to explain and get to know, but to attain to clear and distinct ideas of those things whose causes we subsequently want to discover, â€Å"and thence show that the effect would not be what we know it to be, did it not have such a cause on which it necessarily depends†10. In Descartes? iew, the synthetic method is nothing more than a way of demonstrating a proof what has been found by means of the analytic method that has the disadvantage of not demonstrating the concrete way in which we really attained to the demonstrated knowledge, how effects really depend on their causes (which can only be achieved by analytic demonstration) and only has the merit of expositing the strict dependency of the propositions befo re discovered11. So, if Descartes demands starting with elaborating a clear and distinct idea of the effect that we want to examine, we can see now how he attains to this in the first part of the â€Å"Passions de lAme†. Descartes speaks of the causes of our perceptions with a different interest before in part two he starts to develop the particular definitions of the single passions. First his aim appears to be exactly to form a clear and distinct idea of the passions in a general sense concerning which the main prob9 See Deleuze, Gilles: â€Å"Expressionism in Philosophy, Spinoza†, pp. 155-156 10 Ibid. , p. 156. In a footnote to this sentence, Deleuze quotes Descartes third meditation to give an example that is apt to show the extreme difference to Spinoza? method: â€Å"I recognize that it would not be possible for my nature to be as it is, that is, that I should have in myself the idea of God, did not God really exist. † 11 See Deleuze, Gilles: â€Å"Expressionism in Philosophy, Spinoza†, p. 159; Roth, Leon: â€Å"Spinoza and Cartesianism (II)†, p. 161 4 Christian Scherrer, student number: 013851259 lem seems to be that we usually feel our passions like effects in our soul itself, without seeing any proximate (physical or nervous) cause 12. Only by distinguishing them from the other (passive) perceptions we can have a clear and distinct idea of our passions in general. But in part two Descartes explains that for gaining knowledge of the particular passions this knowledge of the proximate physical cause (some particular movement in the pineal gland) will not suffice and that instead we have to ask for their first cause in order to distinguish the single passions. But, having in mind that Descartes wants to proceed from clear and distinct ideas to their causes and render them clear and distinct as well, the question seems to be again: How can we find the causes of the single passions, if we dont have a clear and distinct idea of them yet? And: Do we not need first the causes of the single passions in order to be able to distinguish them and see them clearly? How do we, so to say, fill the gap which is lurking here? But, as we can see in  §51, there is really a priority of the knowledge of effects over the knowledge of their causes, as Descartes writes: â€Å"( ) still it can be inferred from what has been said that all of these passions can be aroused by the objects that move the senses, and that these objects are their most common and principal causes: from this it follows that, for finding them all, it is sufficient to consider all the effects of these objects. In the next paragraph Descartes specifies that we have to consider, in enumerating and ordering the effects (the passions) in the soul, nothing than the different manners in which their causes have importance or are useful for us, and these manners we can find in the effects themselves before we can know their exact (physical) causes. After having distingu ished the single passions we then can go on to infer their exact causes and define them in a precise way. It is important to notice that the â€Å"passions principales† that Descartes enumerates in the beginning of the second part correlate to the clear and distinct ideas of the effects through which we want to infer their necessary causes, but that there is an additional step in between. It is actually the conclusion from a reduction along these preliminary characterizations to the six passions that are recurring in these everywhere to the reduction to physical causes through which we will be able to explain especially those â€Å"simple primitives† passions, which gives us the sense in which they are conceived as simple and primitive. According to Descartes, we do not need and will not find an independent, distinct cause for each of the principal passions, but as we saw that some of them are contained in the clear and distinct ideas of others and that those few together cover all of them, it will be sufficient to discover their causes alone. The explanations of the â€Å"passions particulieres† (at least in their physiological part) will depend solely on them. Even more, Descartes seems to infer that these six 12 See P §25: â€Å"Les perceptions quon raporte seulement a lame, sont celles dont on sent les effets comme en lame mesme, desquelles on ne connoist communement aucune cause prochaine, a laquelle on les puisse raporter. † 5 Christian Scherrer, student number: 013851259 basic passions are also â€Å"primitive† in a developmental psychological sense when he is tracing back the specific movements of the blood and animal spirits while feeling love, hate, joy, sadness and desire to first experiences of basic physiological processes in the soul after being connected with the body. Thus, the â€Å"primitive passions† are also more primitive as they occur first in every individuals life (see P §Ã‚ §107-111). And in a third sense they are primitive or simple as they can be conceived as simple or pure when we think of their initial occurrences in an individual and also the possibility of their being isolated from certain inclinations and dispositions or their combination/mixture with other primitive passions 13. So, we can read in  §82 about the different kinds of love that, if freed from all desires to possess, the love of a father to his children is pure, as well as can be (especially) admiratio and the other primitive passions. Thus Descartes â€Å"passions particuliers† are found to be complex, secondary passions as a result of his analytical or reductive method: First, they are explainable by means of the definitions or causes of the simple passions. Secondly, they develop in the process of experiences, in the interaction between body and soul out of the primitive passions. Thirdly, they are always mixed out of simple passions, they are their proportions in addition to certain physical inclinations and provoked by cer tain ideas. So, how does Spinoza arrive at defining primary passions and and how does he relate further ones to them? What are the principles behind his taxonomy? As we know, Spinoza does not use the concept of affect in a significant way before his definition in the beginning of the third part. This seems strange and dissatisfying from the perspective of Descartes` method. Does Spinoza just invent a definition? But as inventing does not at all appear like a methodical step in an inquiry, there seems to be a arbitrary element14. There are no conceptual analyses by means of relevant distinctions and no inferences of proximate or first causes from ideas that we can perceive clearly in our mind. What is rather the source for the general definition of affects in part three, the ground on which it rests, is Spinoza`s theory of mind and body, developed in the preceding part, whose major characteristic is its parallelism and which again has its origin in the metaphysics of substance mon 13 Indeed we find in most of the definitions of the particular passions in the third part of the â€Å"Passions de lAme† either an explanation through a certain inclination or disposition of the soul which are caused by a certain movement of the animal spirits in the brain that leave impressions which in return reinforce certain ideas that we form about an object (like in the case of esteem and disdain: see P §149). On the other hand there are those passion that are defined as mixtures of the movements that cause one or the other primitive passion (like in the case of hope and fear: see P §165) 14 See chapter 4 in Jonathan Bennett? s â€Å"A Study of Spinoza? s Ethics†, where he criticizes Spinozas geometrical method as highly self-referential or idiosyncratic and therefore not well founded. I believe that he is misinterpreting what Spinoza himself saw as the merits of his method, on which his â€Å"Tractatus de intellectus emendatione† can shed some light. 6 Christian Scherrer, student number: 013851259 ism in part one. Contrary to Descartes in the â€Å"Passions†, he therefore does not grasp an idea, like passion, action, perception and the like, to subsequently try through a process of analysis to arrive at an adequate definition of this concept by distinguishing it from other ideas; but really begins from his definition of substance, God, or Nature, from which he attempts to show that everything else follows. In the â€Å"Tractatus de intellectus emendatione†, Spinoza stresses that in attaining knowledge through a right method we can only proceed from causes to effects 15 and that we have therefore to start with the best definitions of what we take as a cause: â€Å"Quare recta inveniendi via est ex data aliqua definitione cogitationes formare: quod eo felicius et facilius procedet, quo rem aliquam melius definiverimus. †16. According to this, Spinoza`s way can be described rather like a productive process of construction (truly reminding of the geometrical sense) in which the developed figures are a posteriori given names that have already been familiar to us, like â€Å"action† and â€Å"passion†, â€Å"joy† and â€Å"sadness†. He is less looking for their appropriate content, but rather encounters or meets proceeding along the axioms, definitions and laws that he establishes by and by, and thus with a method – the true natures of those things of which we have always had only inadequate ideas. We can very well observe this procedure in how Spinoza arrives at his definitions of the basic af fects and we can also try to rightly understand the sense in which they are primitive or primary and the others composite or deduced. The crucial step in developing something that can bear the name â€Å"affect† is maybe, when in EIIIP4 first we find the proof (based on evidence) that a thing can only be destroyed by an external cause and then in EIIIP6, Spinoza concludes that, as nothing contrary to a subject? s existence can be part of it, there has to be a strive for self-perseverance in every thing according to its own nature. It is the conscious idea of this strive which explains our first basic affect: desire (cupiditas). The deduced strive for self-perseverance, named conatus, then also serves as the concept by which our two other primary affects can be understood: an alteration in our mind that conforms to our conatus will be called joy (laetitia), while an alteration opposed to it will be called sadness (tristitia). We should note here that between desire on the one hand and joy and sadness on the other there seems to be a certain difference, as Spinoza calls the latter ones in the same passage where he defines them â€Å"passiones†, whereas the former is first characterized only as affect and in 15 See the â€Å"Tractatus de intellectus emendatione†: â€Å"Nam revera cognitio effectus nihil es, quam perfectiorem causae cognitionem acquirere. (†¦) Sed optima conclusio erit depromende ab essentia aliqua particulari affirmativa, sive a vera et legitima definitione. †, p. 70; and also Deleuze, Gilles: â€Å"Expressionism in Philosophy, Spinoza†, pp. 157f. An important aspect is that Spinoza correlates a legitimate and true definition to an affirmative essence. There we can see that defining a certain thing can not consist in showing difference to another thing, be it even an essential difference, but only in affirming its positive essence. 16 Spinoza: â€Å"Tractatus de intellectus emendatione†, p. 70 7 Christian Scherrer, student number: 013851259 deed it seems difficult to conceive of how desire, as being the conscious idea of our conatus could be a passion. But Spinoza will specify (in EIIIP58 f. ) that joy as well as desire must and indeed only they can be called active insofar as their cause consists in an adequate idea. So, although desire might be taken somehow to follow from the two other basic affects, expressing rather a current condition of our mind than a transition into a different state of perfection, the guiding distinction that accounts for Spinoza? exclusive occupation with definitions of passions in part three, separates active desire and joy from passive desire, joy and sadness. Spinoza tells us in the same paragr aph in which he is introducing joy and sadness that he is acknow ledging only these along with desire as the three primary passions and that he will show how all the remaining originate in them 17. But how exactly does he achieve this? The main means which will allow him to account for a diversity of passions will be certain mechanisms or – better – dispositions of the mind by which it is urged to behave in a certain way and to proceed from one idea or one affect to another. The main enetic principles guiding the deduction of the variety of passions in part three are those of attribution of causality (through which love and hate are being defined), associ ation of affects (we can suffer a certain affect just because it has regularly accompanied another one, by which we are affected now, in the past), similarity (unknown things can cause affects in us simply because of their similarity to things we have already been affected by) and imitation (insofar as we have an idea of something similar to us suffering an affect, we will be naturally brought to suffer the same)18. Of great effectiveness are also Spinoza? s assumptions about how the mind will behave in reaction to certain ideas (for example to exclude the existence of a thing which is thought of as the cause of our sadness). These principles seem to suffice to develop the same variety of passions as have been defined by Descartes. But, as we have seen, there is obviously a significant difference between the two methods insofar as Spinoza, so to say, meets our common notions for passions on the way and annexes or almost usurps them for his purposes. The main focus about his method is on the deductive and genetic force of his concepts and definitions. This is why we often have to realize that, in spite of their relative conformity with how we would intuitively describe what our passions consist in, Spinoza is giving quite unconventional definitions that would maybe not convince us if taken out of the context of their interrelation. It is therefore not surprising that in several passages we find con 17 See EIIIP3: â€Å"( ) et praeter hos tres nullum alium agnosco affectum primarium: nam reliquos ex his tribus oriri in seqq. ostendam. † 18 See Renz, Ursula: â€Å"Spinoza: Philosophische Therapeutik der Emotionen†, pp. 322-327. 8 Christian Scherrer, student number: 013851259 iderations concerning the relation between his definitions and our common language for emotions, an aspect that is not at all as noticeable in Descartes because of his analytic approach that allows him to use our common language already before att aining to the knowledge of those phenomena we do have words for. Most remarkably, Spinoza admits that in defining the most important passions he does not want or can not (for some reason which might be very interesting to ask for as an explana tion of this fact) detach himself completely from the usual meanings of the names he adopts: â€Å"Haec nomina ex communi usu aliud significare scio. Sed meum institutum non est verborum significationem, sed rerum naturam explicare easque iis vocabulis indicare, quorum significatio, quam ex usu habent, a significatio, qua eadem usurpare volo, non omnino abhorrent, quod semel monuisse sufficat. † (EIIIDef. XX) On the other hand there is more than one passage in which seems to be completely indifferent to wards any affinities between his definitions and common meanings, as he repeatedly asserts that we can find much more affects than we have words for: â€Å"Et ad hunc modum concipere etiam possumus odium, spem, securitatem et alios affetus admirationi junctos; atque adeo plures affectus deducere poterimus, quam qui receptis vocabularis indicari solent. Unde apparent affectuum nomina inventa esse magis ex eorum vulgari usu quam eorundem accurata cognitione. † (EIIIP52Sch) Here again, it is significant that Spinoza talks of deducing an indefinite number of affects, while Descartes talks about distinguishing (see P §68). We also find the awareness in Descartes that he uses the general and particular words for our passions in a different way than we usually do (which seems always to go along with elaborating a theory). It may as well be supposed that Descartes ex pects there to be new combinations of the primitive passions that might lack a correspondent name in our ordinary language. But my comparison should have shown that the idea about generating new passions is of completely different kind than in Spinoza`s theory. Bibliography Beaney, Michael: Analysis, in: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed. ), URL = . Bennett, Jonathan: A Study of Spinoza? s Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1984. Christian Scherrer, student number: 013851259 Deleuze, Gilles: Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, New York: Zone Books 1990. Descartes, Rene: Die Leidenschaften der Seele, Hamburg: Felix Meiner 1984. Renz, Ursula: Spinoza: Philosophische Therapeutik der E motionen, in: Klassische Emotionstheori en – Von Platon bis Wittgenstein, Hilge Landweer Ursula Renz (ed. ), Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter 2008. Spinoza, Baruch de: Opera/Werke, zweiter Band (Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione/Ethica), Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 1978. Spinoza, Baruch de: Ethik in geometrischer Ordnung dargestellt, Hamburg: Felix Meiner 2007. 10

Tuesday, February 25, 2020

Business Economics Speech or Presentation Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 750 words

Business Economics - Speech or Presentation Example   In winter, it is vice versa. Product supply and demand imbalances also cause the prices of gasoline to fluctuate. This is so because at times demand rises unexpectedly or supply declines suddenly due to production problems. When supply is low, people tend to compete for the little available stock, thus increasing the prices. Such imbalances cause the common fluctuations (Stone, 2008).Since 2005, the prices of gasoline have been continually rising. At no given time have the gasoline prices of the previous year been higher than in the current year. Prior to 2004, the prices were relatively stable – around $2 a gallon. With the growing economy and population, there has been global fear that the oil deposits may soon run out. This has led to people being persuaded to use fuel saving vehicles (Verma, 2007). This, however, has not been forthcoming, because the rich still use fuel guzzlers, and governments have been forced to increase prices of gasoline so that people feel squeez ed and obligated to use fuel conservatively.The prices of gasoline rose steadily from 2005 to 2011, at one point reaching a peak of $4 a gallon in 2011. However, they gradually declined to $3 a gallon in following months. The reason that has caused the prices to rise in 2011 was the political tension in the Middle East and parts of North Africa. Situations like this cause downward shift in the supply curve. When supply decreases and demand remains constant, this leads to a higher price equilibrium.

Sunday, February 9, 2020

Business strategy Assignment Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 2000 words

Business strategy - Assignment Example One of the reasons for this ambiguity can be the lack of a productive identification process (Whiddett and Hollyforde, 1999). Core competencies are often recognized in forms of intangible and tangible assets. Equivalent attention should be paid to both intangible and tangible competencies in order to gain sustainable competitive advantage (Bergenhenegouwen, Horn and Mooijman, 1996). This is because the value added and intangible contributions are much influential and critical (Hafeez and Abdelmeguid, 2003). It has also been pointed out that competitive advantage decreases as a result of the tangible assets. Thus, it can be said that the overall competency of an organization cannot be completed unless the personal competencies are also taken into consideration (Whitehill, 1997). This paper will analyze the core competencies in details. The various benefits and drawbacks of the concept will be explained. The paper will also incorporate expert opinions and critics from various researche rs and academics regarding concepts of core competencies as well as paradoxes. The next part of the paper will try to examine any relationship between concepts of core competency and Icarus paradox. Core competency Model Core competencies can be described as deep proficiencies enabling an organization to deliver quick and unique value to its customers. It symbolizes a firm’s collective experience and learning. It also helps in understanding the coordination of diverse manufacturing and production skills as well as integration of multiple technologies. This type of competency creates sustainable and long term competitive advantage for an organization and helps it in branching out into a broader category of related markets (Collis, 1991). The best advantage of having core competency is that it is very difficult for competitors to procure or copy. Understanding and evaluation of core competencies permit an organization to invest in various strengths which differentiates them and implement strategies for unifying the entire organization (Agha, Alrubaiee and Jamhour, 2012). The concept of core competency was first introduced in the framework of Prahalad and Hamel. They defined core competency as â€Å"An organisation’s major value-creating skills, capabilities, and resources that determine its competitive weapons.† (Hamel and Prahalad, 1990). According to this framework, competition cannot be considered as a market power in the long run. This can be derived from the fact that even though organizations have survived in tough global competition, they are all converging towards similar as well as formidable standards for quality, product cost and timeliness. Thus, managers now need to investigate their internal competencies as well as resources and capabilities for securing sustainable and long-term survival (Eden and Ackermann, 2000). According to the model, core competency can be recognized by application of three tests. These are: Firstly, with the help of a core competency, potential access to a wide market area can be gained. Secondly, core competencies significantly contribute in the creation of perceived consumer benefits of the end service or product. Thirdly, it is hard for competitors to copy or imitate as it involves complex harmonization of production skills and individual technologies. In other words, the understanding of the significance of the competence for competitive differentiation, whether the

Thursday, January 30, 2020

Unethical Practice in Business - Walmarts Gender Discrimination Essay Example for Free

Unethical Practice in Business Walmarts Gender Discrimination Essay Many businesses have gained a bad reputation just by being in business. To some people, businesses are interested in making money, and that is the bottom line. It could be called capitalism in its purest form. Making money is not wrong in itself. It is the manner in which some businesses conduct themselves that brings up the question of ethical behavior. Good business ethics should be a part of every business. There are many factors to consider. When a company does business with another that is considered unethical, does this make the first company unethical by association? Some people would say yes, the first business has a responsibility and it is now a link in the chain of unethical businesses. Many global businesses, including most of the major brands that the public uses, can be seen not to think too highly of good business ethics. Many major brands have been fined millions for breaking ethical business laws. Money is the major deciding factor. Ethics is a branch of social science. It deals with moral principles and social values. It helps us to classify, what is good and what is bad? It tells us to do good things and avoid doing bad things. Is ethical behavior good or bad for business? The advantages of ethical behavior include: 1. Higher revenues demand from positive consumer support 2. Improved brand and business awareness and recognition 3. Better employee motivation and recruitment 4. New sources of finance: e.g. from ethical investors 5. Business ethics offer companies a competitive advantage. Consumers learn to trust ethical brands and remain loyal to them, even during difficult periods. In 1982, Johnson Johnson spent over $100 million dollars recalling Tylenol, its best-selling product, after someone tampered with bottles of the painkiller. The company followed its credo, a set of ethical organizational values, and the result was a boost in consumer confidence, despite the contamination scare. Society benefits from business ethics because ethical companies recognize their social responsibilities. 6. Attract customers to the firms products, thereby boosting sales and profits 7. Make employees want to stay with the business, reduce labor turnover and therefore increase productivity 8. Attract more employees wanting to work for the business, reduce recruitment costs and enable the company to get the most talented employees 9. Attract investors and keep the companys share price high, thereby protecting the business from takeover. 10. It is good for staff for morale to work in an open culture, with possible benefits of increased productivity and staff loyalty. These are vital ingredients in the current climate when staff may be pushed to the limit. An organization known for fair and responsible practice is likely to attract high quality employees and ‘stand out from the crowd.’ 11. Demonstrating sound ethical practices can often be a condition for tendering for contracts with large customers needing to ensure the integrity of their supply chain. Good relationships with customers based on a commitment to honesty and transparency will enhance a company’s reputation. SMEs that are familiar with these demands will have a competitive advantage. 12. There would be happiness in society as people living a life of sharing and contribution. The disadvantages claimed for ethical business include: 1. Higher costs: e.g. sourcing from Fair-traded suppliers rather than lowest price 2. Higher overheads: e.g. training communication of ethical policy 3. Danger of building up false expectations. 4. Business ethics reduce a companys freedom to maximize its profit. For example, a multinational company may move its manufacturing facility to a developing country to reduce costs. Practices acceptable in that country, such as child labor, poor health and safety, poverty-level wages and coerced employment will not be tolerated by an ethical company. Improvements in working conditions, such as a living wage and minimum health and safety standard, reduce the level of cost-savings that the company generates. 5. Bad business ethics also includes illegal actions. For example, falsification of information regarding financial status can lead to criminal prosecutions of business executives. Investors can lose great sums of money due to such practices. UK clothing firm, Primark, has fired three Indian suppliers because they used child labor to finish goods. Real-World Examples of Bad Business Ethics Reputation is a company’s biggest asset and bad business ethics invariably result in loss of reputation and credibility. Yet many large corporate also find themselves caught red handed indulging in shady conduct. Read on for some real life examples of bad business ethics. There are good business reasons for a strong commitment to ethical values: 1. Ethical companies have been shown to be more profitable. 2. Making ethical choices results in lower stress for corporate managers and other employees. 3. Our reputation, good or bad, endures. 4. Ethical behavior enhances leadership. 5. The alternative to voluntary ethical behavior is demanding and costly regulation.

Wednesday, January 22, 2020

My Chevrolet Pride :: essays papers

My Chevrolet Pride With the turn of a key, my LT1 350 engine fires up with a roar that sends Mustang owners whimpering back to the garage. I own a 1997 Chevrolet Camaro Z28. The 1997 Camaro is the thirtieth anniversary of a long history of Chevrolet heritage that has built muscle cars, like mine, and a lowly three-cylinder Geo metro. My raging machine comes off the factory assembly line with a pavement pounding 285 horsepower. That number alone is impressive, but I have tinkered with my engine and it now has around 400 horsepower. The six speed manual transmission lets me tear through the gears like a madman ripping out of his straight jacket. As I mentioned earlier, I have done a lot of work to my car, the most important work being â€Å"Flowmaster† exhaust. This is a rather inexpensive modification that not only gives the beastly sound, but also increases exhaust flow, thus increasing horsepower. The next thing I did to my Z28 was install a pair of â€Å"Hooker† headers, these also help the engine vent off the exhaust. I then put a â€Å"K&N† cold air induction kit and changed the mass air sensor. These two things alone made the biggest difference in throttle response and improved my overall torque through the six gears. On the outside my car is relatively the same as all other Camaro’s with only slight modifications in the cars tint percentage and the fact that I changed the original emblems from black to chrome. I also used some chrome paint to paint the 2 hood vents located on each side of the hood. I am the only person in Morganton, so far, that has his vents painted. Everyone I have talked too says it looks really good and gives the car an even more aggressive look in the front end, so probably in the near future more people will do this and I can say that I set a trend! Camaro’s are one of the most fun cars I have ever had the pleasure of owning. At any given time I can gear down to second and slam the head of my unsuspecting passengers into the back of their seat. This has caused me to take numerous painful slaps to the chest and arms from my friends and mother. My Chevrolet Pride :: essays papers My Chevrolet Pride With the turn of a key, my LT1 350 engine fires up with a roar that sends Mustang owners whimpering back to the garage. I own a 1997 Chevrolet Camaro Z28. The 1997 Camaro is the thirtieth anniversary of a long history of Chevrolet heritage that has built muscle cars, like mine, and a lowly three-cylinder Geo metro. My raging machine comes off the factory assembly line with a pavement pounding 285 horsepower. That number alone is impressive, but I have tinkered with my engine and it now has around 400 horsepower. The six speed manual transmission lets me tear through the gears like a madman ripping out of his straight jacket. As I mentioned earlier, I have done a lot of work to my car, the most important work being â€Å"Flowmaster† exhaust. This is a rather inexpensive modification that not only gives the beastly sound, but also increases exhaust flow, thus increasing horsepower. The next thing I did to my Z28 was install a pair of â€Å"Hooker† headers, these also help the engine vent off the exhaust. I then put a â€Å"K&N† cold air induction kit and changed the mass air sensor. These two things alone made the biggest difference in throttle response and improved my overall torque through the six gears. On the outside my car is relatively the same as all other Camaro’s with only slight modifications in the cars tint percentage and the fact that I changed the original emblems from black to chrome. I also used some chrome paint to paint the 2 hood vents located on each side of the hood. I am the only person in Morganton, so far, that has his vents painted. Everyone I have talked too says it looks really good and gives the car an even more aggressive look in the front end, so probably in the near future more people will do this and I can say that I set a trend! Camaro’s are one of the most fun cars I have ever had the pleasure of owning. At any given time I can gear down to second and slam the head of my unsuspecting passengers into the back of their seat. This has caused me to take numerous painful slaps to the chest and arms from my friends and mother.

Tuesday, January 14, 2020

Criminal proceedings against Alfred John Webb Essay

              The purpose of this contribution is to analyze the relationship between Article 34 TFEU and national rules regulating when, where, how and by whom a lawfully imported and marketed product may be used. According to that provision, quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall be prohibited between Member States.† The Treaty is silent on how one should understand the words â€Å"all measures having equivalent effect†. In Dassonville, the Court held that these words cover â€Å"all trading rules enacted by member states which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-community trade are to be considered as measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions.† This definition is far from being as operational as is sometimes presumed, since it begs at least two questions (Torfaen Borough Council, 1989). First, what measures constitute â€Å"trading rules † and, second, how serious an impact must a measure have before it is â€Å"hindering† intra-community trade.               In its practice, the Court has attached very little, if any, importance to whether national rules aim to regulate trade in goods or whether they pursue other aims. Indeed, in the case law it uses interchangeably the phrases â€Å"trading rules†,1 â€Å"all commercial rules†2, â€Å"all measures†3, â€Å"all rules†4 and â€Å"all legislation†5 to the regulatory subject matter of the national rule in question. The Court’s focus is thus on the effects, not the aim or purpose or the subject matter, of the measure in question. Similarly, regarding the second condition that the national measure be capable of â€Å"hindering† intra-community trade, the Court has consistently refused in principle to apply any de minimis test under Article 34.6 Measures which affect trade only indirectly or potentially therefore fall within the definition of a trade restriction (Torfaen Borough Council, 1989). Indeed, the Court in severa l cases has disregarded statistical evidence showing that imports have increased after a measure was introduced, on the basis that imports might have increased even more in the absence of such a measure.                Consequently, the definition of a trade restriction has become almost all-encompassing, and the legality of huge swaths of national rules therefore depend on the proportionally and justification-test enshrined in Articles 34 and 36 (ex art. 30). This in turn reduces legal certainty for both Member States and traders, and implies a significant risk of judicial overload for the Court itself. As the Sunday-trading saga illustrates, the Court is well aware of these concerns and its ruling in Keck, in relation to a particular group of national rules (i.e., selling arrangements), can be seen as an attempt to meet them. Moreover, in another line of cases, the Court in reality has come close to introducing a de minimis test (albeit at a very low threshold level) by holding that the restrictive effects which a national measure has on the free movement of goods may be too uncertain and too indirect for it to be regarded as capable of hindering trade between Member Stat es (Criminal proceedings against Alfred John Webb, 1981). The difficulty of establishing the appropriate scope of Article 34 of the Treaty is illustrated by the fact that while the Keck jurisprudence has been criticized for being too inflexible and unable to catch all genuine barriers to trade, it has been argued that the Krantz case law is too difficult to apply and therefore generates legal uncertainty. Use restrictions as measures of equivalent effect                  Against this background, let us turn to the relationship between Article 34 and national measures which allow the importation and marketing of a given product, but restrict when, where, how or by whom it may be used (hereafter â€Å"use restrictions†). Such rules are very common in national legislation. As an example, one could mention a requirement for persons to have attained a particular age before acquiring or using the product, such as a rule preventing minors from purchasing and/or drinking alcohol. The notion also covers rules prohibiting the use of the product in certain places or at certain times, like a ban on the use mobile phones in airplanes or a prohibition on the use of fireworks save for a few days of the year. Other examples would be local planning rules prohibiting the use of a given kind of brick or tile for the construction of houses in a particular area or a ban of certain activities for which a good is normally used, for examp le a ban on hunting with dogs and horses.                  Considering the vast number of such rules, it is important to consider whether use restrictions should be regarded as trade restrictions at all, and if so, how intrusive they must be to be caught by Article 34. Even a prohibition on wearing a particular type of clothing, such as a burka, in public places is arguably covered by this concept. On the one hand, the aim of such rules is normally not to regulate trade. Moreover, they generally do not affect the sale of imported goods more than they affect the sale of domestic goods. Finally, with a literal reading of Article 34 of the Treaty and the Court’s own ruling in Dassonville, it may be questioned how rules which do not limit the importation and marketing of the relevant product, but merely regulate how it may be used after its sale, can be said to constitute â€Å"trading rules†( Procureur du Roi, 1974). On the other hand, it is clear that some limitations on how a product may be used can negatively affect sales and import to a very significant extent. Indeed, whereas a prohibition on using mobile phones in airplanes hardly has any such effect, a ban on using fireworks all year except on 31 December is likely to (greatly) reduce demand for, and thus sales and import of, that good. Similarly, one may imagine that a ban on the use of SUVs in congested urban zones would constitute an efficient means for diminishing sales and import of such cars to the benefit of more environmentally friendly vehicles. Still, while it may be relatively easy to accept that rules completely banning the use of a given product constitute measures with equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction, it may be questioned whether rules merely limiting its lawful use need to be subject to a common European judicial control as to their legitimacy, suitability and necessity. To answer this question, it is, in our view, necessary to consider the practical and economic effect on trade of rules rest ricting the lawful use of goods. An argument can be made that, with the exception of (virtually) complete bans on use, the effects of use restrictions differ fundamentally from the effects of product related rules, and that use restrictions should rather be compared to selling arrangements. Part B               Restrictions of the free movement of goods are prohibited by Art 34 TFEU. Art 56 and Art 57 TFEU provide the same prohibition with regard to the freedom to provide and receive services. Up until now, the case law on restrictions of the free movement of goods has been far more extensive and nuanced, especially with the distinction between â€Å"product requirements† and â€Å"certain selling arrangements† made in the famous Keck-decision. However, with an increasing case load the Court’s attention seems to have gradually shifted to Art 56 and Art 57 TFEU. Even though goods and services are covered by separate Treaty provisions, it has been argued that the restriction of those two market freedoms requires equal treatment because of their substantial similarities and the fact that they are economically often strongly related. This close relation is, for example, visible in the area of advertising. In answering the question of whether a nation al ban on advertising is restricting, the focus could lie either on the advertised product or on the advertising service. The Court itself has held that, in the field of telecommunications, it is difficult to determine generally whether it is free movement of goods or freedom to provide services which should take priority, because the two aspects are often intimately linked. As A.G. Jacobs pointed out in Sà ¤ger, it is sometimes even difficult to distinguish between goods and services. An educational service could for example be provided by sending books or video-cassettes to a recipient in another Member State. In this situation there are both reasons to deal with this situation under Art 34 TFEU, as well as under Art 56 TFEU.                Sometimes a differentiation becomes even more elusive. In situations where only the service itself moves – for example by cable or through the internet – the only difference to the sale of goods is the immaterial nature of the offered service in contrast to the material nature of the good.6 Because of this close relation between goods and services, a different treatment of restrictions according to the choice of legal basis would seem arbitrary in many cases. In this paper, I will analyze the relationship between restrictions of the free movement of goods and the freedom to provide services; Is there a uniform restriction approach under Art 34 and Art 56 TFEU, and can the Keck-distinction between product requirements and certain selling arrangements be transposed into the field of services?( Procureur du Roi, 1974). It arises that both restriction-tests are based on the same principles of mutual recognition and nondiscrimination. Further, there is no need for a separate principle of market access because market access is the aim of the restriction test rather than an independent restriction criterion. Finally, it will be demonstrated that there is a need for the establishment of the categories of service requirements and arrangements for the provision of services under Art 56 TFEU equivalent to the Keck-judgment. Restriction of the Free Movement of Goods                   Art 34 TFEU prohibits quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect. The wording of the provision, especially with regards to equivalently effective measures, is not inherently clear. As a consequence, the Court of Justice was given great discretion in interpreting and defining the scope of application of Art 34 TFEU. The Dassonville case in 1974 was the first opportunity the Court took to address the question of what national legislation could, in principle, constitute a measure having equivalent effect. The Court decided to give Art 34 TFEU a very broad meaning and stated that such measures are, â€Å"all trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-[union] trade†. In the important decision Cassis de Dijon the Court also established the principle of mutual recognition (Bond van Adverteerders and, 1988). According to this, Member State s are prohibited from restricting the sale of goods that have been lawfully produced under the rules of another Member State. The restriction is prohibited even if it results from the application of national regulations that do not distinguish between national and imported products (indistinctly applicable measures). The principle of mutual recognition seeks to prevent putting a double burden on imported products by requiring them to comply with two different sets of rules. If the product complies with the home State rules, any other Member State must in general accept that product on its market.                Controversy arises when the principle of mutual recognition and the principle of home.               State controls are used synonymously. In a broad interpretation mutual recognition is defined as a mechanism of allocation of regulatory competence to the country of origin designed to avoid a dual regulatory burden (Graziana Luisi and Giuseppe Carbone, 1984). Others put the focus on functional parallelism and the created further regulatory space for the host State control through the creation of the mandatory requirements exception. The host State can invoke those mandatory requirements, also known as public interest requirements, to justify the national rule and thus keep its regulatory power. However one wants to look at it, it is clear from the case law that there is no automatic recognition or unrestricted regulatory power of the home State because it is limited by the acceptance of mandatory requirements and the principle of functional equivalence. Therefore whenever home State control is mentioned, it has to be borne in mind that it is just a general as sumption of the allocation of regulatory power which can be rebutted.                   As a consequence of the extensive interpretation of Art 34 TFEU by the Court in Dassonville, nearly every national regulation could be brought under judicial scrutiny because it potentially constituted a hindrance to trade. While many consider Dassonville to be judicial activism beyond acceptable bounds, it must be seen in the context of the action or non-action of other European powers. Before the Dassonville decision Member States made little systematic effort to remove non-tariff barriers (Graziana Luisi and Giuseppe Carbone, 1984). The unanimity requirement for Council decisions led to political quasi-inactivity in the 1960s. In response, the Commission issued in 1969 the Directive 70/5017 which gave measures with equivalent effect an expansive reading and listed 19 types of prohibited rules and practices. All these factors influenced the Court in taking quasi-legislative action, becoming itself the driving force for the building of a common market. The most important consequence of Dassonville and following cases was that the Court empowered the main interest group for removing trade barriers, the European traders and producers, to challenge national legislation. Therefore, the pressure was on the Member States to justify legislation contrary to Art 34 TFEU. Limitation by Keck                   The Court’s case law constituted a great incentive to move towards a common market, but the breadth of the Dassonville-formula turned out to be a double-edged sword. The formula, which did not seem to provide limits to judicial review, was increasingly used as an instrument to attack any national legislation which stood in the way of free trade – like the famous Sunday trading cases show – and this led to an overload of cases. Moreover, national courts clearly signaled their disagreement with the lack of sensible limits and guidelines by simply not applying the formula. Finally, the Court faced heavy criticism in academic literature. These developments led to the important Keck decision in 1993. In this decision the Court limited the scope of judicial review regarding indistinctly applicable measures by adopting a differentiation suggested by academics (Bond van Adverteerders and, 1988). The differentiation was made between product r equirements on the one hand, which regulate the composition, packaging or presentation of a product, and certain selling requirements on the other, which only regulate the place, time and manner of selling products.                  According to the Court, product requirements are always considered to have equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction on trade, because they put a double burden on foreign products which already had to comply with their national requirements. In contrast, certain selling arrangements do not fall within the scope of Art 34 TFEU, provided that those provisions apply to all affected traders operating within the national territory and provided that they affect in the same manner, in law and in fact, the marketing of domestic products and those from other Member States. This is because they do not prevent the access of foreign goods to the market or impede the access of foreign goods more than they impede the access of domestic products. With Keck the Court moved on from its approach in Dassonville and decided that, whereas the producing State is responsible for rules on product requirements which have to be recognized by the importing State (which had al ready been decided in Cassis), the importing State has in general the sole regulatory competence regarding certain selling arrangements provided that they do not discriminate products from other Member States in law or in fact. With the decisions in Cassis and Keck and the creation of mandatory requirements, the Court established a complex framework for the split in competence between the home State and the host State. Even though the Keck-decision was much criticized, the court nevertheless continuously applied the established distinction between product requirements and certain selling arrangements in later cases (Manfred Sà ¤ger, 1991). It ruled, for example, that there was no breach of Art 34 TFEU in cases of time limitations to the sale of goods or the provision that certain products can be sold only by licensed retailers. Nevertheless, if the selling arrangement is either discriminatory (in fact) or capable of imposing a double burden33, the Court will find a breach of Art 34 TFEU (Bond van Adverteerders and, 1988). Although the distinction has its shortcomings, especially because certain measures, such as advertisement regulations, cannot be put in one of the two categories, the Court has continually and successfully applied the Keck framework until today. However, in addition to the distinction between product requirements and certain selling arrangements, the rather elusive notion of â€Å"market access† and â€Å"market access test† has played a more and more prominent part in the academic discussion and in the Court’s case law. Two recent cases – Commission v. Italy (trailers) and Mickelsson and Roos36 – have given again cause to argue that the Court has put the focus back on a purely nondiscriminatory market access approach. I will now first analyze the notion of market access and then address the question of whether a market access test fulfills a separate function beside the distinction between product requirem ents and certain selling arrangements. I contend that the case law on market access can be traced back to the same principles that underlie the Keck-case law, being non-discrimination and mutual recognition, and that there is thus no need for a restriction test based on market access. References Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Benoà ®t and Gustave Dassonville, [1974] ECR 837 Case 33/74, J.H.M. Van Binsbergen v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalnijverheid, [1974] ECR 1299 Case 74/76, Iannelli & Volpi SpA v. Ditta Paolo Meroni, [1977] ECR 557 Case 279/80, Criminal proceedings against Alfred John Webb, [1981] ECR 3305 Joined Cases 286/82 & 26/83, Graziana Luisi and Giuseppe Carbone v. Ministero del Tesoro, [1984] ECR 377 Case 188/84, Commission v. France (woodworking), [1986] ECR 419 Case 352/85, Bond van Adverteerders and others v. The Netherlands State, [1988] ECR 2085 Case C-145/88, Torfaen Borough Council v. B & Q plc, [1989] ECR 3851 Case C-288/89, Stichting Collectieve Antennevoorziening Gouda and others v. Commissariaat voor de Media, [1991] ECR I-4007 Case C-76/90, Manfred Sà ¤ger v. Dennemeyer & Co. Ltd, [1991] ECR I-4421 Source document

Sunday, January 5, 2020

An Analysis Of Loraine Hansberry s A Raisin And The Sun

Taneka Butts March 30, 2017 African American Literature Professor Tavel Family Importance Where would we be without our family? In our everyday lives, we get so caught up, we sometimes take our families for granted each day. Mothers, Fathers, siblings, step children, step parents, cousins, aunts, uncles, and grandparents or any other combination of those characters all build up to make the structure of family. No matter if it’s immediate or extended family, no one family is perfect, no matter how we would like to pretend our family to be. Apart of every family, there is the alcoholic, the gambler, the dreamer, the drug attic, the war veteran, the pretender, the criminal, the mentally challenged and so on that exist one form or another.†¦show more content†¦Sometimes, women believe we have a sixth sense about things and would like to prevent setbacks from happening, but a man must be a man sometimes and find out in his own. Walter also argues with his mother about giving him part of the insurance check so he will be able to have a respecta ble career. Beneatha who is Walter younger sister, she is outspoken and has different views on how or what a woman should represent. Beneatha dreams to go to school and become a doctor. While Walter does not seem to believe Beneatha should be a doctor, he says to her, â€Å"If you so crazy about messing around with sick people, then go be a nurse like other women† or just be quiet and get married† (481). In that quote, Walter was implying that women are only suitable to be supportive to men. Lena, known as Mama wants Walter to be the man of the house, but won’t allow him to be a man because she herself is the women of the house. Mama finally realizes that everyone else, including herself, was not giving Walter the opportunity to be a man therefore, she gave him part of the insurance money and says† it aint much, but it’s all I got in the world and I’m putting it in your hands† (509). I think letting someone else take charge of something that is valued so much is an extremely tough decision, but we as humans must that chance. In addition to the roles of gender roles being a factor to the importance of family, each member of the Younger family hasShow MoreRelatedThe Matriarchs of the House in A Raisin in the Sun by Loraine Hansberry814 Words   |  3 PagesIn A Raisin in the Sun by Loraine Hansberry, the three strong-willed women of the story have varying opinions, views, and beliefs on life. The story is set in the Southside of Chicago, Illinois. The Younger’s are an African-American family that has struggled to survive financially for many years. With a large injection of money from Mr. Younger’s death, the family struggles to make a unanimous decision on what they will use the 10,000 dollars for. The three major female characters differ in a variety